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ARTICLES

ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
Michael F. Urbanski*
James R. Creekmore**
Beth G. Hungate-Noland***

I. INTRODUCTION

This year witnessed the advance of a wide variety of antitrust
and trade regulation theories, most of which met with little success. Of the antitrust cases, Continental Airlines waged a successful battle to eliminate carry-on baggage restrictions at Dulles
Airport.' Additionally, Maryland's price-setting scheme for liquor
was not accorded state action immunity.2 On the other side of the
ledger, another antitrust litigant failed to overcome the requirement that efforts to petition the government must be objectively

" Principal, Woods, Rogers &Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 1978, College of William and Mary;, J.D., 1981, University of Virginia School of Law. Mr. Urbanski
is the Chairman of the Litigation Section at Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., and is a
former Chairman of the Antitrust, Franchising, and Trade Regulation section of the Virginia State Bar.
** Associate, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 1990,
University of Virginia; J.D., 1993, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law. Mr. Creekmore is a member of the Business Litigation Practice Group at Woods,
Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., and is both the Newsletter Editor and Vice Chair of the
Board of Governors for the Antitrust, Franchising, and Trade Regulation section of the
Virginia State Bar.
*** J.D. Candidate, University of Richmond School of Law, 2003; B.A., 1999, Armstrong Atlantic State University; B.A., 1994, Roanoke College.
1. See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D. Va.
2001), discussed infra Part lI.D.
2. See TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001), discussed infra Part
II.B.
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baseless in order to meet the sham exception to the NoerrPennington doctrine.3 Difficulties in proving an antitrust injury
and the intent element of a section 2 conspiracy to monopolize
claim 4 ended another long-pitched battle over limited vermiculite
resources.5 The Fourth Circuit treated an exclusive supply case
with the same sort of back-of-the-hand treatment accorded most
vertical restraint cases over the past ten years.6 Likewise, regardless of the statutory or regulatory scheme, dealership and franchise termination cases met with little success.7 Finally, while the
malice requirement in the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act (the
"Act")8 has become ingrained in Virginia jurisprudence as the legal malice standard, courts are finding other ways to dispose of
these claims.9 In doing so, courts have enunciated a clear and
convincing evidence standard for cases under the Act.
This article addresses antitrust and other trade regulation decisions of Virginia's state and federal courts over the past year as
well as enforcement efforts and legislative developments in this
field of law.
II. ANTITRUST DECISIONS

A. Sherman Act: Noerr-PenningtonSham Claim Rejected
In Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co.,"° the plaintiff
2
sued under the Sherman Act 1' and Maryland Antitrust Statutes,1
alleging that the defendant's conduct was designed to preclude

3. See Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 237 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2001),
discussed infra Part II.A.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
5. See Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 558 (W.D. Va.
2001), discussed infra Parts II.E., III.B.2.
6. See Microbix Biosystems, Inc. v. Biowhittaker, Inc., No. 00-2262, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11576 (4th Cir. June 4, 2001), discussed infra Part II.C.
7. See, e.g., John Deere Constr. Equip. Co. v. Wright Equip. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 689
(W.D. Va. 2000), discussed infra Part III.F.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
9. See, e.g., Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 544 S.E.2d 666 (2001), discussed infra
Part III.B.1.
10. 237 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2001).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
12. MD. CODE ANN., [COM. LAW II] §§ 11-201 to -213 (2000).
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Baltimore Scrap's entry into the relevant market. 3 When Baltimore Scrap sought to build and use a new metal shredder, the defendant-competitor secretly funded litigation designed to undermine Baltimore Scrap's attempt to obtain zoning approval for the
new shredder." The district court found, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, that under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, 5 the defen6
dant's wrongful conduct was protected.
The court held that the zoning litigation did not fall under the
"sham litigation" exception to the Noerr-Pennington 7 doctrine because the litigation was not "objectively baseless." 8 In support of
this conclusion, the court reasoned that "an objective litigant
could reasonably expect to achieve success on the merits." 9 Furthermore, the source of funding for the litigation belied its predatory nature, and Baltimore Scrap's failure to offer sufficient evidence that would prove otherwise did not affect the legitimacy of
the claims.2 ° The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that
the litigation was fraudulent and thus fell under another exception to Noerr-Pennington protection. 2 ' Finally, the court found
that "[tihe replay of state law zoning disputes is not normally the
proper function of antitrust litigation, especially when the alleged

13. Baltimore Scrap, 237 F.3d at 396.
14. See id. at 396-98.
15. In general, an effort to influence the exercise of government power, even for the
purpose of gaining an anticompetitive advantage, does not create liability under the antitrust laws. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961), the Supreme Court held immune from antitrust liability an association of rail
freight interests that were formed to pass legislation that would grant the members of the
association a competitive advantage over truckers. Id. at 145. The Supreme Court has
read Noerr broadly: "Noerrshields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence
public officials regardless of intent or purpose.... Joint efforts to influence public officials
do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition." United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
16. Baltimore Scrap, 237 F.3d at 396.
17. Id. at 399. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not protect litigation from suit under the antitrust laws if the litigation is a "sham." Id. In Noerr,the Supreme Court recognized that if an action, "ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor [then] the application of the Sherman Act
would bejustified."Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
18. Baltimore Scrap, 237 F.3d at 399. In Columbia v. Omni OutdoorAdver., Inc., 499
U.S. 365 (1991), the Court adopted an objectively baseless standard for Noerr-Pennington
sham cases, effectively limiting their reach. Id. at 380-81.
19. Baltimore Scrap, 237 F.3d. at 400.
20. Id. at 401.
2L Id. at 402.
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fraud did not deprive the litigation of its underlying legitimacy
and when the lawsuit is not objectively meritless."22
B. Sherman Act: State Action Immunity Rejected
In TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer,23 the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland's liquor regulatory scheme violated the Sherman Act 24 and
that state action immunity would not protect Maryland.25 The
owner and operator of a large retail liquor store sued Maryland's
State Comptroller "seeking a declaration that Maryland's regulatory scheme, which (1) requires liquor wholesalers to post prices
and adhere to them and (2) prohibits volume discounts, is a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."26 Maryland argued that the state
action doctrine protected its pricing regulations and that the
Twenty-first Amendment27 of the United States Constitution
overrides a Sherman Act challenge to the regulations.2"
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Maryland's laws governing a
post-and-hold pricing system, mandated by the state's Alcoholic
Beverages Code and implemented by the State Comptroller, were
not protected by the state action doctrine. 29 Rather, the court
noted that the post-and-hold system was a hybrid restraint. 0 The
prohibition of volume discounts was an element of the hybrid restraint "because it reinforce[d] the post-and-hold system by mak-

22. Id. at 404.
23. 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
25. TFWS, 242 F.3d at 213. The doctrine of state action immunity was first enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
In Parker,the Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit states from
imposing restraints on competition. Id. at 351. The Court later explained that "[alIthough
Parker involved an action against a state official, the Court's reasoning extends to suits
against private parties." S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 56 (1985).
26. TFWS, 242 F.3d at 201-02.
27. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
28. See TFWS, 242 F.3d at 203.
29. Id. at 210.
30. Id. at 208.
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ing it even more inflexible."3 ' Therefore, the court concluded that
2
the Maryland system was classic per se horizontal price fixing.

The court vacated the order of dismissal and remanded the
state's Twenty-first Amendment defense for further proceedings,
reasoning that both sides should have the opportunity to offer
evidence on the issue. 3 The court provided the district court with
a step-by-step balancing test to determine "'whether the interests
implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation
may prevail."34
C. Sherman Act: Claim that Exclusive Supply Agreement
Violated ShermanAct Failsfor Lack of Proofof Injury in Fact
In Microbix Biosystems, Inc. v. Biowhittaker, Inc.,35 the plaintiff, Microbix, brought an action against Biowhittaker alleging
violations of the Sherman Act36 and tortious interference with
economic relations." The federal district court in Baltimore,
Maryland, ruled that the defendant was entitled to summary
judgment on the claims, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 8
Microbix acquired small quantities of cells from Biowhittaker
for use in an experimental program.39 After forming an exclusive
supply agreement with another laboratory, however, Biowhittaker informed Microbix that it would no longer supply Microbix with cells.4 ° Microbix filed suit claiming the exclusive supply agreement violated the Sherman Act.4 Finding that Microbix

31. Id. at 209.
32. Id. at 213.
33. Id. at 202.
34. Id. at 212-213 (quoting 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 347 (1987)).
35. No. 00-2262, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11576 (4th Cir. June 4, 2001).
36. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999). Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for any person to "combine or
conspire... to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States."
Id,§ 2 (1994).
37. Microbix, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11576, at *1-2.
38. Id. at *6.
39. See id. at *2-3.
40. See id. at *3-4.
41. See id. at *l.
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"failed to present [sufficient] evidence [demonstrating] that the
exclusive supply agreement... was a material cause of Microbix's 'alleged injury' and that Microbix's claims for loss of future
profits was 'too speculative,"' the district court rejected the antitrust claims.4 ' Furthermore, the district court concluded that the
state law claim for tortious interference with economic relations
possessed "'the same defects as those of the antitrust claims.' 43
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly
granted summary judgment to Biowhittaker. 4
D. Sherman Act: Airline Carry-on Baggage Template an Antitrust
Conspiracy
An agreement between defendants United Air Lines ("United")
and Dulles Airport Airline Management Council ("AMC"), an association of air carriers serving Washington Dulles International
Airport ("Dulles"), to restrict the size of carry-on bags at Dulles
resulted in another antitrust conspiracy case this past year.4"
AMC's members included United and Continental Airlines ("Continental"). 46 In April 2000, United and AMC agreed, over Continental's objections, to install baggage "templates" to prevent bags
larger than a certain size from passing through the x-ray machines at Dulles' two main security checkpoints.47 Because all
passengers departing from Dulles must pass through one of these
two checkpoints, the defendants' agreement effectively imposed
the carry-on bag size restriction on all Dulles carriers, including
Continental.48
After spending a considerable amount of money to increase its
aircrafts' carry-on storage capacity and to relax its carry-on baggage policy, Continental vigorously opposed the installation of

42. Id. at "5.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *6.
45. Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E.D. Va.
2000) [hereinafter Continental1], summary judgment granted in part, 126 F. Supp. 2d 962
(E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter Continental III, judgment entered, 136 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D.
Va. 2001) [hereinafter ContinentalII1].
46. Continental I, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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carry-on baggage templates.49 After the templates were installed,
Continental, among other things, employed personnel to lift the
templates for their customers at the Dulles baggage screening
checkpoints in order to avoid the carry-on restrictions imposed by
the defendants." Immediately after the installation of the templates, Continental filed suit against the defendants
i) for violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, (Count I) and its
Virginia counterpart, Va. Code § 59.1-9.5 (Count II); (ii) for intentional interference with contractual relations (Count III) and with
prospective economic advantage (Count IV); and (iii) for violation of
the Virginia Business Conspiracy Statute, Va. Code § 18.2-499

(Count V). 51

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia issued three opinions in connection with this case.5 2 In
Continental I, the court first denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss Continental's federal antitrust claim.5 3 The court's analysis relied upon the "'Rule of Reason,' which requires a court to
analyze a restraint's impact on competition in a relevant market."54 The court concluded that defendants' motion must fail "because 'it is not inconceivable' that Continental 'could prove a set
of facts supporting the relevant market definition alleged in its
complaint."'5 5 However, the court dismissed Continental's state
law claims in counts two through five as preempted by the Airline
Deregulation Act ("ADA"). 56 Even though the claims sought to
promote fair competition, they conflicted with the ADA's purpose
of preventing state regulation of air carriers' rates, routes, and
services and, as a result, were preempted."
In Continental II, the court tackled the parties' cross-motions

49. Id. at 560-61.
50. Id. at 561 n.4.
51. Id. at 559.
52. See supra note 45.
53. ContinentalI, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
54. Id. at 563. The Rule of Reason approach is used "'where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious.'" Id. (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986)). For further discussion of the Rule of Reason, see also Continental II, 126 F. Supp. 2d 962,970-71 (E.D. Va. 2001).
55. Continental I, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (quoting MCM Partners v. Andrews-Bartlett
& Assocs., 62 F.3d 967, 977 (7th Cir. 1995)).
56. Id. at 573. The ADA can be found at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-50105 (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
57. ContinentalI, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
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for summary judgment on Continental's federal antitrust claim
(count I in Continental 1)." Under an abbreviated application of
the Rule of Reason, the court concluded that the defendants'
agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade that caused
the plaintiffs antitrust injury.5 9 According to the court, the "defendants... failed to identify any valid, competition-enhancing
effects of their agreement to restrict carry-on baggage size at Dulles." ° The court further stated that the defendants' agreement
did not promote competition itself, "but rather only helps individual carriers in competition with other carriers by relieving them
of the competitive pressure to offer better products and services
with respect to carry-on baggage."61
The court also rejected the defendants' claim that Continental
had not suffered an antitrust injury under section 4 of the Clayton Act." The court opined that the restriction constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade, which caused the plaintiffs antitrust injury.63 Absent defendants' restrictive agreement, Continental would have been able to attract more low-yield passengers
from other airlines.6 4 The court concluded that because Continental could have gained market share in that particular consumer
group, it had suffered injury to its business and property in the
form of lost profits.65 The court also noted that Continental had
suffered damages in the form of the costs of mitigating the competitive injury caused by defendants' restriction.66
Following yet another hearing, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued its ruling on
damages." The court first concluded that a damage award based
58. Continental11, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
59. Id. at 968. For a discussion of the abbreviated Rule of Reason, see id. at 972-74.
This abbreviated application "skips the inquiry into anticompetitive effects because those
effects are manifest from the nature of the restraint," focusing instead on 'the procompetitive justifications offered in support of the restraint." Id. at 972-73 (referencing California
Dental Assoc. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-71 (1999); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
109 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998)).
60. Id. at 979.
61. Id. at 980.
62. Id. at 982. The Clayton Act can be found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27a (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
63. ContinentalII, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
64. Id. at 983.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See ContinentalIII, 136 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D. Va. 2001).
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on Continental's lost revenues or profits would be speculative and
therefore inappropriate." However, the court allowed Continental
to recover treble damages based on the costs of mitigating the injury it sustained as a result of the unlawful agreement.6 9 The
court also enjoined United and AMC "from employing or agreeing
to employ any baggage sizing template or device at Dulles security checkpoints, or at any common location through which Continental passengers may pass."7 °
E. Conspiracy to Monopolize Claim FallsShort on Intent and
Injury Grounds
In Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.," the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia considered two issues: (1) whether Historic Green Springs, Inc.
("HGSI") conspired to injure Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. ('VVL") by
monopolizing the vermiculite industry in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act 72 and the Virginia Antitrust Act; 73 and (2)
whether "HGSI conspired to injure VVL in reputation, trade,
business, or profession, in violation of the Virginia Conspiracy
Act."74 VVL brought action against W.R. Grace & Co. ("Grace")
and HGSI alleging that Grace and HGSI conspired to prevent
VVL from conducting business in Virginia by joining in donation
transactions and incorporating restrictive covenants which prevented deeds of gift and lease assignments.7 5 VVL claimed that
Grace and HGSI conspired with the specific intent to, among
other things, injure VVL's reputation and to allow Grace to obtain
a monopoly in the vermiculite industry.76
Grace, a vermiculite mining, processing and distribution busi-

68. Id. at 546.
69. Id. at 548.
70. Id. at 552.
71. 144 F. Supp. 2d 558 (W.D. Va. 2001).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
73. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 2001). The Virginia Antitrust Act
prohibits "[elvery conspiracy ... or attempt to monopolize... trade or commerce of this
Commonwealth." VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.6 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
74. Virginia Vermiculite, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 561. The Virginia Business Conspiracy
Act can be found at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp.
2001).
75. Virginia Vermiculite, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
76. Id.
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ness,77 purchased more than one-thousand acres of land for vermiculite mining in Louisa County, Virginia." Grace did not mine
the land but instead retained it for twenty years, despite significant cost, to prevent competitor VVL from accessing the vermiculite reserves.7 Initially, Grace considered selling the land to VVL
and participated in sales negotiations with VVL over a five-month
period. 0 Grace later opted to donate the land to HGSI with the
goal of putting VVL out of business.8 ' The donation would include
restrictive covenants forbidding any future mining on the donated
land. 2
In its analysis of the evidence presented by both VVL and
HGSI, 3 the court concluded that neither Grace's nor HGSI's primary motive was to create a monopoly. 4 Furthermore, the court
rejected VVL's contention that Grace's and HGSI's concerted efforts caused it to suffer an antitrust injury in the form of transportation damages.85 VVL failed to prove that the unlawful donation of property to HGSI was a "but-for" cause of alleged
additional transportation costs. 6 In finding that HGSI was not
liable for conspiracy to monopolize under either the Sherman Act
or the Virginia Antitrust Act, the Court stated that although
HGSI may have conspired with Grace to injure VVL, such intent
is not sufficient to establish an intent to create a monopto injure
7
oly.

8

III. TRADE SECRET AND BUSINESS CONSPIRACY DECISIONS
A. Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act
8 the plaintiff appealed
In Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East,"

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 561.
See id. at 563-67.
See id. at 566-67.
See id. at 568-71.
See id. at 573-82.
See id. at 579-82.
Grace settled with VVL immediately before the trial. Id. at 561.
Id. at 593.
See id. at 600.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 610.
262 Va. 33, 546 S.E.2d 424 (2001).
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a decision of the Pulaski Circuit Court "holding that a covenant
not to compete executed by its former employee, Gregory C. East,
was overbroad and therefore unenforceable."89 While the Supreme
Court of Virginia agreed with the circuit court's ruling of unenforceability, the court reversed the circuit court's judgment upon
another issue, finding that the evidence was insufficient to impose an injunction against East.90
Motion Control Systems ("MCS"), a designer and manufacturer
of high performance drive systems including brushless motors,
requested its employees to sign a "Confidentiality and Noncompetition Agreement" ("Agreement"). 9 The final sentence of paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement stated: "The term 'business similar
to the type of business conducted by the Company' includes, but is
not limited to any business that designs, manufactures, sells or
distributes motors, motor drives or motor controls."92 East proposed changing this sentence by deleting "but is not limited to"
and adding "currently."9 MCS accepted the changes, and East
signed the Agreement.94 East later resigned from MCS and began
working for Litton Systems, a manufacturing operation that
makes brushless motors. 95
The trial court found that MCS and Litton Systems made similar products and that MCS had reasonable fears of Litton Systems putting MCS out of business. 96 However, the trial court held
that the Agreement was unenforceable because the final sentence
of Paragraph 3(b) "'imposed additional restraints which are far
greater than reasonably necessary to protect [MCS] in [its] legitimate business enterprise."'97 Nevertheless, the trial court did
enjoin East from disclosing any of MCS's confidential or trade secret information. 9 MCS appealed the decision, and East assigned

89. Id. at 35, 546 S.E.2d at 424.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 35, 546 S.E.2d at 425.
92. Id. at 36, 546 S.E.2d at 425.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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as cross-error the injunction under the Virginia Uniform Trade
Secrets Act ("VUTSA"). 9 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia began its analysis by duly noting that "covenants not to compete are restraints on trade and accordingly are not favored."" 0 The court then focused on whether
the language of Paragraph 3(b) was overbroad.' ' The court concluded that the prohibition in the Agreement reached beyond
business similar to the employer's business by prohibiting employment in any business that sells motors regardless of whether
they are the specialized types MCS sells.'0 2 Even though East altered the range of prohibited employment under the Agreement,
these changes did not sufficiently restrict the prohibited employment to businesses engaging in similar activities to MCS.' As a
result, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's holding that
the Agreement was overbroad and unenforceable.0 4
The court, however, reversed the trial court's injunction
against East.'0 5 Although East had knowledge of MCS's trade secrets, the court held that mere knowledge would not support an
injunction under the VUTSA, which requires "actual or threatened misappropriation."" 6 This opinion renders meaningless the
protection afforded by the VUTSA for "threatened" misappropriation and effectively leaves Virginia business exposed to clandestine theft.
In Newport News Industrial v. Dynamic Testing, Inc., 17 the operating division of Newport News Shipbuilding sued a former
employee and his new employer, Dynamic Testing, Inc. ("DTI"),
for several business torts arising out of the employee's alleged
misappropriation of the plaintiffs trade secrets.0 " In one claim,
Newport News Industrial ("NNI") sought to hold DTI liable for

99. Id. at 36, 546 S.E.2d at 424. The Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act can be found
at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
100. Motion Control, 262 Va. at 37, 546 S.E.2d at 425.
101. Id. at 37, 546 S.E.2d at 426.
102. Id. at 37-38, 546 S.E.2d at 426.
103. Id. at 38, 546 S.E.2d at 426.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 38-39, 546 S.E.2d at 426.
106. Id. The Virginia Code provides the requirements for injunctive relief under the
Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-337 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
107. 130 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001).
108. See id. at 746-48.

2001]

ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION

the employee's alleged violation of the VUTSA.0 9 DTI moved to
dismiss that claim on the grounds that the VUTSA does not allow
for the imposition of liability under the theory of respondeat superior." ° DTI argued that the VUTSA imposed liability only if one
knew or had reason to know of the misappropriation."'
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied
DTI's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings," noting that
nothing in VUTSA rejects the concept of vicarious liability."' The
VUTSA's definition of "misappropriation" requires some form of
misconduct or bad faith by the misappropriator." 4 Nothing in the
statute, however, bars liability for the employer due to the employee's misconduct or bad faith conducted for the benefit of the
employer." 5 The court held that "[tihe employer reaps the benefit
of the employee's misconduct and therefore should be liable for
the harm that conduct causes." 6
B. VirginiaBusiness ConspiracyAct
1. Supreme Court of Virginia: Rigorous Conspiracy Standard
Applied
In Simmons v. Miller,"' Simmons, a shareholder of Las Palmas
Tobacco, Ltd. ("Las Palmas"), sued the director and the attorney
of the corporation on several theories including conspiracy to in118
jure Las Palmas under the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act.

109. Id. at 748.
110. Id. at 749.
111. Id. at 750.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 751.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
115. Newport News Indus., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
116. Id. at 754.
117. 261 Va. 561, 544 S.E.2d 666 (2001).
118. Id. at 570-71, 544 S.E.2d at 672-73. The Virginia Business Conspiracy Act subjects to criminal liability any two persons who "combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert together for the purpose of... willfully and maliciously injuring another in
his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever." VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-499 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001). Any person injured by reason of a violation
of Virginia Code section 18.2-499 may file a civil action and recover treble damages pursuant to Virginia Code section 18.2-500(a) and injunctive relief pursuant to Virginia Code
section 18.2-500(b). VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-500 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
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Simmons alleged that Miller, the director, and Kear, the attorney,
secretly replaced Las Palmas with a different corporation." 9 After
Miller unsuccessfully attempted to buy out Simmons' minority interest, Miller told the corporation's attorney to file articles of organization for a new company, Las Palmas Tobacco International,
L.L.C. ("International"), in which Simmons would have no interest. 2° International took over the assets and business opportunities of Las Palmas.' 2 ' As a result, Simmons brought action
against Miller and Kear in the Fairfax Circuit Court.'22 Both
Simmons and Miller sought review of the rulings after a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Simmons on twelve of his sixteen
claims.'23
The trial court set aside the jury's verdict on Simmons' individual claim of statutory conspiracy under the Virginia Business
Conspiracy Act ("VBCA"), holding that a derivative action is the
sole means of redress for injury to the corporation. 2 4 The Supreme Court of Virginia did not reach that issue, instead holding
that the evidence of conspiracy was insufficient to support the
verdict on a claim for statutory conspiracy, whether brought individually or derivatively.'25
Retreating a bit from the expansive interpretation accorded
this statute in recent years, the supreme court applied a clear
and convincing standard to establish legal malice.'26 This should
help stem the tide on the cases brought under the VBCA in recent
years since Commercial Business Systems, Inc. v. BellSouth Services, Inc."' overruled the then-prevailing Greenspan v. Osherofd28 primary and overriding purpose standard.'29 While finding

119. Simmons, 261 Va. at 570, 544 S.E.2d at 672.
120. See id. at 566-70, 544 S.E.2d at 669-72.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 570-71, 544 S.E.2d at 672-73.
123. See id. at 571-72, 544 S.E.2d at 673-74.
124. Id. at 577-78, 544 S.E.2d at 676.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 578, 544 S.E.2d at 677.
127. 249 Va. 39, 453 S.E.2d 261 (1995).
128. 232 Va. 388, 351 S.E.2d 28 (1986).
129. Id. at 398, 351 S.E.2d at 35. Commercial Business Systems overruled Greenspan,
finding that the VBCA did not "require proof that a conspirator's primary and overriding
purpose [was] to injure another in his trade or business." Commercial Bus. Sys., 249 Va. at
47. 453 S.E.2d at 267.
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that clear and convincing evidence of legal malice 3 ° existed, the
claim, finding insufficient evicourt repudiated the conspiracy
3
dence of concerted action.1 '

Because Simmons had to prove that Kear "combined, associated, agreed, mutually undertook, or concerted together with
Miller in such conduct,"'32 the court found that the contacts between the alleged co-conspirators were insufficient, focusing principally on one conspirator's lack of knowledge of the other's conduct. 3 3 Upon reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that
Simmons failed to establish that Kear knew of Miller's actions
concerning the assets of Las Palmas. 34 Perhaps more remarkable
than the court's opinion rejecting the jury's finding of conspiracy
was footnote four of the opinion.'35 In this footnote, the court
noted that the two conspirators had an attorney-client relationship but did not reach the issue whether they could conspire as
36
such because the existence of that relationship was not argued.
In the end, the court held that, due to the lack of evidence, the
the derivative and individual
trial court did not err in striking
3
claims for statutory conspiracy. 1
2. Western District of Virginia: Otherwise Actionable Business
Conspiracy Fails for Lack of Causation
The Virginia Vermiculite3 ' case also involved the Virginia
Business Conspiracy Act. The court focused on the element of legal malice, which required VVL to prove that Grace and HGSI
undertook a concerted action to injure VVL "intentionally, pur-

130. Legal malice is defined as action taken "intentionally, purposefully, and without
lawful justification." Simmons 261 Va. at 578, 544 S.E.2d at 677 (citing Feddeman & Co. v.
Langan Assoc., 260 Va. 35, 44, 530 S.E.2d 668, 673 (2000); Tazewell Oil Co. v. United Va.
Bank, 243 Va. 94, 108, 413 S.E.2d 611, 619 (1992)).
131. Id. at 579, 544 S.E.2d at 677.
132. Id. at 571, 544 S.E.2d at 677; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996 &
Cum.Supp. 2001).
133. Simmons, 261 Va. at 579, 544 S.E.2d at 677.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 578 n.4, 544 S.E.2d at 676 n.4.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 579, 544 S.E.2d at 677.
138. Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 558 (W.D. Va.
2001). See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text for further discussion of Virginia
Vermiculite.
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posefully, and without lawful justification."'3 9 The court concluded
that, according to the evidence, Grace and HGSI purposefully and
intentionally acted in concert to cause VVL to go out of business
by preventing VVL from replenishing its diminishing vermiculite
reserves. 14' The court held that this shared purpose sufficiently
established the intent
element required by the Virginia Business
4
Conspiracy Act.' '
The Virginia Business Conspiracy Act, the court noted, requires VVL to prove that "at least one of the co-conspirators acted
either with an unlawful purpose or by unlawful means." The
evidence established that "Grace donated its properties to HGSI
by unlawful means, namely, by breaching its contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing toward" the original property owners,
the Peerses.14 The Peerses sold their property with the expectation of receiving royalties from Grace's mining royalties."M According to the court, "Grace intentionally disregarded the Peerses'
financial interest when it donated the Peerses' property to
1, 45
HGSI.
Finally, in order for VVL to be entitled to damages or injunctive relief, the court assessed the requirement that the concerted
action cause injury to VVL. 46 The court concluded that VVL
failed to prove that HGSI's and Grace's concerted action "caused,
47
threatened to cause, or will cause VVL to suffer any injury."
VVL lacked sufficient evidence to prove that Grace would have
sold or even leased its properties to VVL or that Grace would
have allowed VVL to mine the properties in absence of both the
covenants and donations. 148 Thus, despite finding that defendant
combined and conspired with the requisite level of legal malice

139. Virginia Vermiculite, 144 F. Supp. 2d. at 601 (quoting Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va.
561, 578, 544 S.E.2d 666, 677 (2001)). The court noted that "the statute requires that one
party, acting with legal malice, conspire with another party to injure the plaintiff." Id(quoting Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 108
F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 1997)).
140. See id. at 601-05.
141. Id. at 605.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 606.
145. Id. at 607.
146. Id. at 609.
147. Id. at 610.
148. Id. at 599.

20011

ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION

through unlawful means, the court rejected the claim on causation grounds.'49
C. Lanham Act: FalseAdvertising Claims Upheld
In JTH Tax, Inc. v. H&R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc., 50
the plaintiff and thirteen Liberty Tax Service franchises (collectively "JTH") sued H&R Block for violating the Lanham Act' 5 ' by
engaging in false and misleading advertising by offering "no additional charge refund anticipation loan[s]" during the 2000 tax
season.'52 The court's analysis relied upon the interpretation of a
false statement under the Lanham Act as either "(1) literally
false as a factual matter or by necessary implication, or (2) literally true or ambiguous but implicitly convey[s] a false impression,
misleading in context, or likely to deceive consumers." 53
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that H&R Block's "Spend more quality time with
your refund" advertisement was literally false without the disclaimer, but literally true yet misleading with the disclaimer."'
The court then examined H&R Block's other print and television
advertisements, concluding that they also were literally true but
misleading.'55 The court noted that, under the Lanham Act, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that literally true but misleading ad56
vertisements deceived at least twenty percent of the consumers.
The court was satisfied with JTH's evidence establishing that the
false advertising campaign was intentional and H&R Block acted
in bad faith. 7 JTH's evidence also established that H&R Block's
false advertisements were material to consumers' purchasing de-

149. See id. at 609-10.
150. 128 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Va. 2001).
151. The Lanham Act can be found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
152. JTH Tax, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
153. Id. at 934 (citing C.B. Fleet Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,
131 F.3d 430, 434 (4th Cir. 1997); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir.
1993)).
154. Id. at 935.
155. See id. at 936-37.
156. Id. at 937.
157. Id. at 938.
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cisions by demonstrating "that consumers prefer a refund over
any loan product."15
Of particular note was the court's thorough discussion of the
plaintiffs remedies.'5 9 Constrained by the Lanham Act's requirement that any award must be compensatory, not punitive, in nature, the court refused to award plaintiff "all or even most" of
H&R Block's profits. 60 Instead, the court found a basis in the record for awarding a percentage of H&R Block's profits for the
2000 tax season, plus a share of its profits from future business
generated through repeat customers. 16' The court also awarded
JTH its costs, attorneys' fees, and narrow injunctive relief.'62
In a second case arising under the Lanham Act, Cornwell v.
Sachs,'6 ' the court granted plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction upon finding that that defendant used the plaintiffs
name without authorization and also issued false and misleading
advertising regarding the plaintiff.'6 4 Author Leslie Raymond
Sachs began writing a series of increasingly threatening letters to
fellow author Patricia Cornwell and her agents after reading an
advertisement for Cornwell's forthcoming novel. 165 The letters
66
suggested that Cornwell had used Sachs' ideas in her book.
Thereafter, his letter-writing campaign developed into an endeavor to fabricate a scandal surrounding Cornwell's book.'67
Sachs then announced his intention to use the fabricated scandal
and Cornwell's name in his efforts to market his own novel. 6 '
Cornwell ultimately sued Sachs, asserting claims for defamation and violations of the Lanham Act and Virginia's privacy
statute.'6 9 Cornwell simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining Sachs from using her name for advertising

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
(Repl.

Id. at 940.
See id. at 943-52.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 944-45.
See id. at 947, 952.
99 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2000).
Id. at 696, 714.
See id. at 697-99.
See id.
See id. at 700.
See id. at 700-01.
Id. at 701. Virginia's privacy statute can be found at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40
Vol. 2000).
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and/or promotional purposes and making false statements to deceive the public. 7 ' Finding that Cornwell was "virtually certain of
success on the merits of her claim,"' 7 ' the court granted her motion and preliminarily enjoined Sachs from using Cornwell's
name in any fashion for purposes of advertising his book. 7 2 The
court also ordered Sachs to take affirmative steps to remove all
references to Cornwell from his website and from copies of his
books for sale.'7 3
D. Lanham Act: Unfair CompetitionPreliminaryInjunction
Denied
In Yellow Cab Co. v. Rocha,7 4 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia denied the plaintiffs motion
for preliminary injunction. 5 Yellow Cab filed a motion for preliminary injunction against Rocha alleging a violation of the
Lanham Act's prohibition of unfair competition, common law and
statutory unfair competition, common law trade dress infringement, and common law trade name and service mark infringement.7 6 The injunction sought to bar Rocha, the owner of a competing taxi company, from using the Yellow Cab service mark or
trade name, using any telephone number associated with that
service mark, painting any of its cabs yellow, or "committing any
other act that constitutes unfair competition against the plain77
tiff.1
In applying the balancing test standard for awarding a preliminary injunction, the court examined four factors.7 8 First, the

170. Cornwell, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
171. Id. at 709.
172. Id. at 714.
173. Id.
174. No. 3:OOCV00013, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11597 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2000).
175. Yellow Cab, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11597, at *26.
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id. at *6.
178. Id. at *9-10. The determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction must
be made after consideration of the factors presented in Blackwelder FurnitureCo. v. Seilig
Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977): (1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to the
plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is not granted; (2) the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the preliminary injunction is granted; (3) the likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. See id. at 195-97. The Fourth Circuit advises that the most important consideration under this standard is the balance-of-
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court looked for but found no evidence that Yellow Cab would be
irreparably injured by a loss of good will or diversion of customers
to Rocha's cab company.'79 The court arrived at this conclusion by
noting that: (1) Rocha agreed to voluntarily refer customers who
mistakenly called his company to Yellow Cab's business; (2) Rocha allegedly occupied a slightly different niche in the market
than Yellow Cab; and (3) Rocha and his company did not appear
to be harming the Yellow Cab's reputation. 8 ° Second, the court
examined the potential injury to the defendant cab company,
finding that the injury was likely to be substantial if Rocha was
forced to adopt a new trade name and telephone numbers pursuant to an injunction.' Third, the court found that the record did
not "support a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,"" 2
noting that Yellow Cab "bears the burden of proving that Y[ellow]
C[ab] and the yellow trade dress are not generic."1 8

3

The court

concluded that Yellow Cab failed to prove the necessary requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction. i" Finally, the court
held that the public interest did not appear to be at risk by denying Yellow Cab's request for injunction.'85 The court thus found
that Yellow Cab did not succeed in proving its case under the balancing186test, and denied the company's preliminary injunction request.

E. Trade Regulation: Truth in Lending, Virginia Consumer
ProtectionAct
In Compton v. Altavista Motors, Inc.,"17 the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia examined the
claims surrounding plaintiff Compton's purchase of a used motor
vehicle from Altavista. 18 During the transaction, Altavista presented Compton with various documents, including a down payhardships to the plaintiff and the defendant. Id. at 196.
179. Yellow Cab, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11597, at *13.
180. Id. at *11-12.
181. Id. at *15.
182. Id. at *24.
183. Id. at *19-20.
184. Id. at *24.
185. Id. at *25.
186. Id. at *26.
187. 121 F. Supp. 2d 932 (W.D. Va. 2000).
188. Id. at 933.
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ment agreement, buyer's order, and a credit contract." 9 Compton
brought suit against Altavista asserting that they had violated
the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 90 the Virginia Consumer Protection Act ("VCPA"),' 9 ' Virginia usury law,'92 and that they had
committed federal and Virginia odometer fraud.'93 The court considered Compton's motion for summary judgment and Altavista's
cross-motion for summary judgment, granting and denying both
94
in part.
The court found that Altavista had violated TILA with regard
to the credit contract it drafted for Compton's signature.'9 5 The
credit contract failed to disclose the amount paid by Altavista to
an insurance company on Compton's behalf.'9 6 The court held
that, with regard to the credit contract, Compton was entitled to
recovery for Altavista's disclosure violations.'9 7 Although a particular transaction may violate TILA in a variety of ways, the
court noted that "a plaintiff is only entitled to one recovery per
credit transaction."' 9 Therefore, the court did not address all of
Compton's credit contract claims. 99
The court rejected Compton's argument regarding Altavista's
alleged failure to make disclosures under its down payment
agreement.2 0 The court found that TILA did not require separate
disclosures for the down payment agreement where "there was no
finance charge and because the balance of the down payment was
payable prior to the due date of the second payment under the
credit contract."20 ' The court therefore denied Compton's motion

189. Id. at 933-34.
190. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 4008 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691c-1 (1994
& Supp. V 1999).
191. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
192. Id. § 6.1-330.77 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
193. Compton, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 933. The federal and Virginia odometer fraud statutes can be located respectively at 49 U.S.C. § 32705 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) and VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-1532 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum.Supp. 2001).
194. Compton, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
195. Id. at 936.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 935.
198. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 16.04(g) (Supp. V 1999); Carney Worthmore Furniture, Inc.,
561 F.2d 1100, 1103 (4th Cir. 1977)).

199. Id.
200. Id. at 937.
201. Id. at 938.
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for summary judgment and granted Altavista's cross-motion with
regard to the down payment agreement." 2
The court denied Compton's motion for summary judgment
with regard to her claims under the VCPA. °3 Compton alleged
that Altavista had committed consumer fraud in connection with
the issuance of her thirty-day tags and with her purchase of liability insurance.2" 4 The court found the "current record too
sparse to support an award of summary judgment" and reserved
those issues for trial.20 5
The court also denied both parties' motions for summary judgment on the usury claim.20 6 Compton argued that the allegedly
requisite insurance payments were unlawful additional finance
charges under Virginia Code section 6.1-330.77."' Finding that a
genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the voluntariness of Compton's insurance purchases, the court held that summary judgment was not proper.
The court also rejected Compton's claim that Altavista committed odometer fraud under the Federal Odometer Act.20 9 Compton
did not assert that the mileage on the odometer of the car she was
purchasing was inaccurate, rather she asserted that Altavista
violated the Federal Odometer Act by disclosing the mileage on
the odometer disclosure statement instead of on the title.210 Finding that Compton could not show that Altavista committed the
violation with an intent to defraud, the court granted Altavista's

202. Id. at 938-39.
203. Id. at 940.
204. Id. at 939-40.
205. Id. at 940.
206. Id.
207. Id. The Virginia Code prohibits additional finance charges beyond those "agreed
upon by the seller and the purchaser." See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.77 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
208. Compton, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 940.
209. Id. The Federal Odometer Act requires that the transferor of a vehicle provide the
transferee with a written disclosure either "of the cumulative mileage registered by the
odometer," or "that the mileage is unknown if the transferor knows that the mileage registered by the odometer is incorrect." 49 U.S.C. § 32705(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999). The statute
also states that a transferred vehicle may not be licensed in a state unless the transferee
submits the transferor's title, which must contain a signed and dated mileage disclosure
made by the transferor, along with an application for a new title. Id. § 32705(b) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999). Moreover, the regulations state that "[iun connection with the transfer of
ownership of a motor vehicle, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee
in writing on the title." 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c) (2000).
210. Compton, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
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cross-motion for summary judgment on that claim.2 1' Furthermore, because the Virginia Odometer Disclosure Statute 212 does
not contain a civil component,2 1 3 the court also granted Altavista's
motion for summary judgment as to Compton's claim that Altavista violated the statute.21 4
F. Trade Regulation: Terminationof Dealer Contracts
In John Deere Construction Equipment Co. v. Wright Equipment Co.,215 the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia conducted a choice-of-law analysis to determine6
21
whether Maryland law applied to the dealer contracts at issue
and held that, under Maryland law,21 ' a manufacturer can terminate contracts with its authorized dealer upon the death of the
dealer's major shareholder.2 1
In 1984, the plaintiff, John Deere Construction Equipment
Company ("John Deere") signed two dealer contracts in Maryland
with Wright Equipment Company ('Wright"), authorizing Wright
to be its local dealer in utility and forestry equipment for Virginia.1 9 Over sixteen years later, the president, founder and major shareholder of Wright, Harold Wright, died.22 In January
2000, John Deere notified the trustees of Wright's estate of its intention to terminate both contracts 180 days following the date of
that notice. 22' The notifications proferred four reasons for termination of the authorized dealership: (1) the death of Wright; (2)
John Deere's contention that it "no longer offers agreements of

21L Id. at 942.
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1532 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum.Supp. 2001) (stating that all
motor vehicle dealers "shall comply with all requirements of the Federal Odometer Act"
and Virginia odometer law "by completing the appropriate odometer mileage statement
form for each vehicle purchased, sold or transferred, or in any other way acquired or disposed of').
213. Id. Virginia Code section 46.2-1532 states that a "person found guilty of violating
any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor." Id.
214. Compton, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
215. 118 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Va. 2000).
216. Id. at 691-93.
217. MD.CODE ANN., [Com. LAw] § 19-302(7) (2000).
218. JohnDeere, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
219. Id. at 690.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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this type"; (3) insufficient sales by Wright; and (4) contractual
provisions in the dealership agreements providing for termination
without cause.2 2 John Deere brought this declaratory judgment
action to adjudicate its right to terminate the contracts.22
The court noted that if Virginia law applied, the Virginia
Heavy Equipment Dealer Act ("Virginia Act")22 4 required John

Deere to have good cause other than the death of Harold Wright
in order to terminate the dealer contracts.225 The court then examined three Virginia choice-of-law principles 226 to determine
whether Virginia or Maryland law controlled the resolution of the
dispute. 227 First, the court cited the general rule that the "nature,
validity, and interpretation of a contract is governed by the law of
the place where it was made, unless there is an express intention
to the contrary."228 Second, the court examined Wright's conten-

tion that an older Virginia case governed, which held that "where
a contract is to be performed in a state other than the one in
which it was made, it will be presumed that the parties intended
the law of the place of performance to govern." 229 The court re-

jected Wright's argument, noting that the case cited by Wright,
while not overruled, had not been supported by more recent cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia. 2" Third, the court
cited another traditional rule that "matters of contract performance are to be considered under the law of the place of performance."231 In analyzing whether the first or the third rule would

222. Id. at 691.
223. Id. at 690.
224. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-353 to -363 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
225. John Deere, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 692. The Virginia Act states that
"[n]otwithstanding the terms, provisions or conditions of any agreement, no supplier shall
unilaterally amend, cancel, terminate or refuse to continue to renew any agreement,
unless... good cause exists for amendment, termination, cancellation, nonrenewal, [or]
noncontinuance." VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-354(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). The Virginia Act limits
"good cause" to the "withdrawal... of the sale of its products in Virginia," or "dealer performance deficiencies." Id.
226. The court recognized that Virginia followed '"traditional' contract choice of law
principles." John Deere, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (citing Fuisz v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 61
F.3d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 1995)).
227. See id. at 691-93.
228. Id. at 692 (citing Lexie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 251 Va. 390, 394, 469
S.E.2d 61, 63 (1996); C.I.T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 22, 195 S.E. 659, 661 (1938)).
229. Id. (citing Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240, 242 (1919)).
230. Id. at 693 (citing Tate v. Hain,181 Va.402, 25 S.E.2d 321 (1943)).
231. Id. (citing Arkla Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. West Virginia Timber Co., 146 Va. 641,
650, 132 S.E. 840, 842 (1926); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 358 (1934)).
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apply, the court reasoned that the question before them was one
of validity of the termination provisions, not performance of the
contracts; therefore, the first general rule applied and dictated
the application of Maryland law.2
The Maryland Equipment Dealer Contract Act ("Maryland
Act")233 generally prohibits a manufacturer from terminating a
dealer contract without cause.234 However, in contrast to the Virginia Act, the Maryland Act has exceptions to the good cause requirement where, for instance, the individual proprietor or major
shareholder withdraws from the dealership "without the prior
written consent of the supplier."23 5 The Maryland Act thus permits the termination of dealer contracts where, as in this case,
the major shareholder dies. 236 The Maryland Act requires that the
manufacturer give 180 days notice of such termination,2 37 which
John Deere supplied Wright's trustees. 8 The court thus granted
John Deere's motion for summary judgment and entered a declaratory judgment that the contracts were validly terminated.2 39
G. VirginiaPetroleumProductsFranchiseAct: HearsayProvides
No Exception to Divorcement Clause
In Frank Shop, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 240 a service station owner, Frank Shop, brought suit against Crown Central Petroleum Corporation ("Crown") regarding Crown's construction of a service station within one and one-half miles of
Shop's service station.24 1 The "divorcement clause"4 2 of the Virginia Petroleum Products Franchise Act ("VPPFA") 21 '"prohibits a
producer or refiner of petroleum products from operating a retail

232.
233.
234.
235.
302(7)
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
MD. CODE ANN., [Com. LAW] §§ 19-101 to -505 (2000).
Id. § 19-301(c)(2) (2000).
John Deere, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., [COM. LAW] § 19(2000)).
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., [Com. LAW] § 19-304 (2000).
John Deere, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
Id. at 693-94.
261 Va. 169, 540 S.E.2d 897 (2001).
Id. at 172, 540 S.E.2d at 899.
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.16:2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
Id. §§ 59.1-21.8 to -21.18 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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gasoline outlet within one and one-half miles of a retail outlet operated by a franchised dealer."' 2 Crown argued that the "grandfather clause"2 45 under the VPPFA provided an exception to the
divorcement clause for outlets operated by a producer or refiner
as of July 1, 1979.246 Frank Shop claimed that the term "operated"
in the grandfather clause should be interpreted by employing the
language of another section of the VPPFA, which defines "operation of a retail outlet" as "the ownership or option to buy a properly zoned parcel of property for which a permit to build a retail
outlet has been granted."24 7

The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's finding in favor of Crown on the basis that Crown's evidence proving
its entitlement to the grandfather exception should not have been
admitted by the Henrico Circuit Court. 24' That evidence consisted
primarily of a form filed with the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in 1979 by a former owner of the
property that stated that such owner was the "Producer/Refiner
Operator" of the retail outlet on the property. 249 The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that this document was hearsay and did
not qualify under the government records exception 25 because it
was neither prepared by nor reflected facts within the knowledge
or observation of a public official. 251' Further, the court ruled that
the document did not qualify under the "business records" exception2 52 to hearsay because it was not a business record of the gov-

244. Frank Shop, 261 Va. at 173, 540 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting Beach Robo, Inc. v. Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp., 236 Va. 131, 132, 372 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1988)).
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.16:2(E) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
246. FrankShop, 261 Va. at 173, 540 S.E.2d at 899-900.
247. Id. at 173, 540 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.10 (Repl. Vol.

2001)).
248. Id. at 177, 540 S.E.2d at 901-02.
249. Id. at 172, 540 S.E.2d at 899.
250. The government records exception to the hearsay rule is alluded to in Virginia
Code section 8.01-390(A). See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-390(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp.
2001).
251. Frank Shop, 261 Va. at 173, 540 S.E. 2d at 899-900.
252. The court noted:
"Under the modern Shopbook Rule, adopted in Virginia, verified regular entries may be admitted into evidence without requiring proof from the regular
observers or record keepers, generally limiting admission of such evidence to
facts or events within the personal knowledge of the recorder. However this
principle does not necessarily exclude all entries made by persons without
personal knowledge of the facts recorded; in many cases, practical necessity
requires the admission of written factual evidence that has a circumstantial
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ernment agency3 that certified it to be a true and correct copy of
the document.1
Accordingly, with the only evidence supporting the grandfather
exception deemed inadmissible as hearsay, the court ruled that
Crown had failed to prove its entitlement to the grandfather exception.2 5 4 The case was remanded to the circuit court for a determination of Frank Shop's proper remedy under the VPPFA 5
H. VirginiaWine FranchiseAct: Termination Upheldfor
Contract Violation
In The Country Vintner, Inc. v. Rosemount Estates, Inc.,256 a
wine wholesaler filed a complaint with the Virginia Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board ("ABC Board") alleging that a wine producer did not have good cause to terminate the exclusive distributorship required by the Virginia Wine Franchise Act. 7 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the decision of the Richmond Circuit Court and the ABC Board's determination that good cause
did exist to justify the termination of the distribution agreement.258
The exclusive distribution agreement between the parties required the wholesaler, Country Vintner, to "contact all
on-premises/off-premises retail licensees within [Virginia] at reasonable intervals and to use its best efforts to sell to them [Rosemount wines] in an aggressive, effective and diligent manner."25 9
Country Vintner successfully marketed Rosemount's wine products to restaurants, specialty wine shops and large retailers but
deliberately chose not to distribute the wine to large retail gro-

guarantee of trustworthiness."
Id. at 175, 540 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting Kettler & Scott, Inc. v. Earth Tech. Cos., 248 Va.
450, 457, 449 S.E.2d 782, 785-86 (1994)).
253. Id. at 176, 540 S.E.2d at 901.
254. Id. at 177, 540 S.E.2d at 901.
255. Id. at 177, 540 S.E.2d at 902.
256. 35 Va. App. 56, 542 S.E.2d 797 (Ct. App. 2001).
257. Id. at 59, 542 S.E.2d at 798. The Virginia Wine Franchise Act can be found at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-400 to -418 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001). The pertinent termination provision can be found at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-406 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp.
2001).
258. Country Vintner, 35 Va. App. at 60, 542 S.E.2d at 799.
259. Id. (alteration in original).
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cery stores in Northern Virginia despite being verbally requested
to do so by Rosemount on several occasions.260
Rejecting Country Vintner's contention that the contract interpretation imposed an unreasonable requirement, the court noted
that the distributor sold to grocery chains in southern Virginia
and had previously sold Rosemount wines to grocery stores in
Northern Virginia through a sub-contracted distributor."' The
court of appeals held that such a choice, particularly given Rosemount's express requests, was in violation of the parties' agreement to market to all outlets in Virginia. 2 The court commented
that nothing in the agreement allowed Country Vintner to limit
its distribution efforts to certain retailers. 3
I.

VirginiaConsumer ProtectionAct: Alternative Theories
Rejected

In Bay Point Condominium Ass'n v. RML Corp.,26 the Norfolk
Circuit Court examined multiple causes of action raised by the
plaintiffs for alleged structural defects, in the form of wood rot
and decay, resulting from the failure of synthetic stucco, manufactured by Dryvit Systems, Inc. ("Dryvit"), to prevent water intrusion into the walls of a condominium.2 6 5 In addition to tort and
contract causes of action, Bay Point Condominium Association
("Bay Point") also alleged civil conspiracy, violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act ("VCPA")2 66 and violation of Virginia's deceptive advertising statute.2 6' Dryvit filed demurrers to
each of the claims,
which the court sustained in part and over68
2

ruled in part.

Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc.,269 the

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
at VA.
268.
269.

Id. at 60-61, 542 S.E.2d at 799.
Id. at 64-66, 542 S.E.2d at 801.
Id. at 66, 542 S.E.2d at 802.
Id. at 67, 542 S.E.2d at 802.
52 Va. Cir. 432 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Norfolk City).
Id. at 433.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
Bay Point, 52 Va. Cir. at 433. Virginia's deceptive advertising statute can be found
CODE ANN. § 18.2-216 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
Bay Point, 52 Va. Cir. at 433, 453-54.
236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55 (1988).
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court reviewed and rejected Bay Point's negligence cause of action, finding that the injury claimed was a purely economic loss
and "not an injury to person or property for which the law of torts
offers redress."27 ' Moreover, Bay Point could not support their
negligence per se cause of action by asserting a breach of Virginia's Uniform Statewide Building Code2 7' because the code does
not prescribe regulations
governing the manufacturing or sale of
22
synthetic stucco.
The court, in its analysis of the breach of implied warranty
claims, found that, absent privity of contract with the manufacturer, Dryvit, Bay Point could assert a claim only for direct damages under Virginia Code section 8.2-714(2), but not for consequential damages.
The direct damages would constitute the
difference between the value of the product as accepted and the
value it would have had if it had been as warranted.7
The court sustained Dryvit's demurrers to the plaintiffs' claims
for actual and constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation. With regard to the fraud claims, the court found that Bay
Point failed to allege particular facts to support its claims of reliance on Dryvit's alleged misrepresentations.2 6 The court noted
that Bay Point's contract was with RML Corporation ("RML"),
and it did not appear that Bay Point relied on any misrepresentations by Dryvit when entering into its contract with RML or that
it was involved with RML's decision to install the synthetic stucco
2 7
on the condominiumY.
Furthermore, the court observed that
Virginia has not recognized a separate cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.
The court also rejected Bay Point's claims of civil conspiracy

270. Bay Point, 52 Va. Cir. at 437.
271. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-97 to -119 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
272 Bay Point, 52 Va. Cir. at 437.
273. Id. at 440. The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that privity of contract is required for recovery of consequential economic loss damages in a claim for breach of warranty. Beard Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Thompson Plastics, Inc., 254 Va. 240, 245, 491
S.E.2d 731, 734 (1997).
274. Bay Point, 52 Va. Cir. at 440.
275. Id. at 453.
276. See id. at 445.
277. Id. at 442.
278. Id. at 443.
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and violation of the VCPA.279 In the civil conspiracy claim, the
court found that the plaintiffs had failed to specify the persons or
entities with whom Dryvit allegedly conspired."' Moreover, the
court deemed the "sale of building materials from a manufacturer
to a general contractor for use in the construction of a home" to be
a "commercial transaction," and therefore it "did not fall within
the [VCPA's] definition of a 'consumer transaction."'28 '
Finally, the court overruled Dryvit's demurrer to the alleged
violation of Virginia's deceptive advertising statute. 2 The court
rejected Dryvit's argument that the plaintiffs must assert a
criminal conviction under the deceptive advertising statute to
claim damages under Virginia Code section 59.1-68.3.213 Instead,
the court found that plaintiffs were required only to assert a violation of the deceptive advertising provision, not a conviction, in
order to claim damages under Virginia Code section 59.1-68.3."
The court also repudiated Dryvit's attempt to categorize the
plaintiffs' deceptive advertising claim as a fraud claim in order to
assert that plaintiffs failed to allege facts with sufficient particularity to support their claim.285 The court found no such common
requirement between a deceptive advertising claim and a fraud
claim. 6 The court reserved judgment on the issue of whether Bay
Point's claim was barred by the statute of limitations until the
date of the plaintiffs' purchase of the synthetic stucco was established.287
In Davis v. Relocation Properties Management, L.L.C.,288 the

Spotsylvania Circuit Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims against
the seller arising out of plaintiffs' purchase of a residential prop-

279. Id. at 453.
280. Id. at 444.
281. Id. at 446. The VCPA's definition of consumer transaction can be found at VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1-198 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
282. Bay Point, 52 Va. Cir. at 448.
283. Id. at 448-49. The Virginia Code allows no action for damages for violations of VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-214 to -246 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001) (relating to deceptive
advertising) and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-21.1 to -21.7:1 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (relating to
housing sales). See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-68.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
284. Bay Point, 52 Va. Cir. at 448-49.
285. Id. at 448.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 449, 453-54.
288. 53 Va. Cir. 215 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Spotsylvania County).
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erty that was later revealed to be infested with termites.289 Applying general contract law principles, the court found that a handwritten addition to the parties' contract providing that the residence was sold "as is"overrode the contract's conflicting preprinted warranty for termite infestation.29" Therefore, the seller,
Relocation Properties Management ("RPM") had not breached the
terms of the contract by failing to pay the cost of extermination
and repairs.29 '
The court also held that RPM had not violated the Residential
Property Disclosure Act292 because RPM made the proper disclaimer in its contract and provided Davis with a report of a pest
control expert, thereby satisfying the "letter and spirit of the
Act."2 93 Finally, because the court found no misbehavior under the
two causes of action described above, the defendant was not liable
under the VCPA for any "'fraudulent acts or practices' in connection with consumer transactions." 294 The court thus sustained the

defendant's demurrers, with leave for plaintiffs to file amended
pleadings.295
IV. TRADE REGULATION DECISIONS

A. Petroleum MarketingPracticesAct-No Independent Basis for
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Interstate Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan296 involved a dispute between a petroleum franchiser and franchisee relating to the operation of a service station. 29' This decision followed an earlier decision of the Fourth Circuit that was vacated when a rehearing en
banc was granted.298 On appeal, the issue was whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.29 9 The court noted
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See id. at 219.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 219.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to -525 (Repl. Vol 1995 & Cum.Supp. 2001).
Davis, 53 Va. Cir. at 218.
Id. at 218-19.
Id. at 219.
249 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacating 228 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 217.

298. See Interstate Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan, 228 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2000).
299. Interstate Petroleum, 249 F.3d at 217.

484

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:453

that it had a "special obligation" to resolve the question of subject
matter jurisdiction any time the issue is raised, even sua
sponte. °°
Interstate Petroleum ("Interstate") and the Morgans "entered
[into] a franchise agreement whereby Interstate, as franchiser,
agreed to sell British Petroleum ("BP") brand gasoline and petroleum products to the Morgans, as franchisees." ° ' After the Morgans failed to comply with a letter agreement, Interstate brought
suit in federal court for breach of contract.02° Interstate's complaint alleged federal question jurisdiction under the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA") 313 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.304 Interstate argued that because the PMPA provides for suits by a
franchisee against a franchiser,0 5 it implicitly authorizes a franchiser to bring action against a franchisee.0 6
Acknowledging that the district courts are divided on the effect
of the PMPA on similar suits, the Fourth Circuit followed the decisions denying subject matter jurisdiction.0 7 The court noted
that it would not make a difference whether the franchiser was
30
seeking declaratory relief, as the Declaratory Judgment Act
neither creates nor expands jurisdiction of a federal court. 3" The
court reasoned that the case involved a breach of contract under
3
state law, but did not involve a federal questionY.
" Therefore, the
court found that the "PMPA did not create Interstate's cause of
action, nor was there a disputed question of federal law that was
" ' Accordingly,
a necessary element of Interstate's claim."31
the case

300. Id. at 219.
301. Id. at 217-18.
302. Id. at 218.
303. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1994).
304. InterstatePetroleum,249 F.3d at 218.
305. The PMPA states that "[ilf a franchisor fails to comply with the requirements of
[Section 2802 or 2803 of this title], the franchisee may maintain a civil action against such
franchisor." 15 U.S.C. § 2805(a) (1994).
306. InterstatePetroleum,249 F.3d at 218-19.
307. Id. at 220.
308, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
309. InterstatePetroleum,249 F.3d at 221 & n.7.
310. Id. at 221.
311. Id. at 222.
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was vacated and remanded, with instructions to dismiss without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.312
B. AnticybersquattingConsumer ProtectionAct

In America Online, Inc. v. Huang,3 ' plaintiff America Online
("AOL") filed suit against various foreign defendants including
eAsia, Inc., a California corporation with its principal place of
business in Taipei, Taiwan.31 4 In the suit, AOL alleged, among
other things, violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA")3 15 and unfair competition. 6 eAsia, the only
defendant AOL was able to serve, develops Internet-related software primarily directed toward Chinese-speaking regions of
Asia.1 7 eAsia offers a communications protocol, "ICQ," the same
name that AOL uses for one of its instant communications services.""
eAsia moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction." 9 AOL argued that jurisdiction was proper because eAsia
had used the Internet to register the domain name "ICQ" with
the registrar company Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), which is
located in Herndon, Virginia.3 2 ° For this claim, AOL relied on Virginia Code section 8.01-328.1(A)(1), which subjects a nonresident
defendant to personal jurisdiction for any cause of action arising
from that defendant's transaction of business in Virginia.3 2'
The court noted that the only cause of action arising from
eAsia's registration was the ACPA claim.32 2 The court also determined that with regard to domain name disputes based on federal

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000).
Id. at 849.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999).
America Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 850.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Virginia Code outlines when personal jurisdiction may be exercised. See

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(1) (Cum.Supp. 2001).

322

America Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
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trademark infringement, the use, not the registration, of the domain name is the relevant tortious act. 323 In a thorough and informative opinion from the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, Judge Ellis reasoned that it was "difficult to view the
act of registering a domain name over the Internet as 'transacting
business' in the registrar's state of residence."324
325
The court proceeded directly to the due process analysis,
finding that the domain name agreements with NSI did not constitute sufficient contacts with Virginia. 326 The court concluded
that the registration agreements were not substantially related to
Virginia, and "eAsia's limited Internet contacts with NSI [did]
not... form the basis for personal jurisdiction."327 The court also
rejected AOL's argument that "eAsia purposefully directed its activities at Virginia" by infringing the trademarks of two corporations located in Virginia.328 The court granted eAsia's motion,329
holding that the "mere registration" of a similar or identical domain name "or the operation of a passive Web site using the allegedly infringing domain name" did not satisfy the requirements
for personal jurisdiction in the trademark owner's state of residence.330
In Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 331 the court described "the nature of a plaintiffs burden to prove the 'absence' of
personal jurisdiction" over the registrant of the allegedly infringing mark before the plaintiff may proceed in rem against the allegedly infringing mark itself.33 2 Recognizing that the burden set
out in subpart (I) of the in rem statute 33-that is, the inability to
obtain personal jurisdiction over the registrant of the infringing
domain name-is "difficult to apply,"334 the court held that a

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id.
Id. at 855.
See id. at 853.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 859.
106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000).
Id. at 861.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. V 1999).
Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
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plaintiff need only "demonstrate some indicia of due diligence in
trying to establish personal jurisdiction over [a] ...potential de335
fendant."

Heathmount A.E. Corporation ("Heathmount"), an entertainment company, alleged that Elliott Salmons registered the defendant domain names technodome.com and destinationtechnodome.com despite Heathmount's usage of these terms in its
advertising. 36 In support of in rem jurisdiction, Heathmount asserted that Salmons was a Canadian resident, that "[his] only
contact with the United States was his registration of the defendant domain names with NSI" 337 in Herndon, Virginia,338 and that
he had "denied being subject to personal jurisdiction in Virginia"
in a related Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") proceeding.3 9 These factors led the court to find
that Heathmount had exercised sufficient due diligence to meet
the requirement of subpart (I) of the in rem statute.34 °
The court then examined "whether, under Virginia law, the
registration of a domain name [could] satisfy the requirements of
due process and ... [confer] personal jurisdiction over Salmons."34 ' The court noted its concerns regarding whether the registration of a domain name constituted "'transacting business"
but instead elected to focus on the due process requirements,
finding that "the 'transacting business' requirement [could not]
exceed the limits of due process."342 The court followed the reasoning in America Online3" and concluded that, under the Virginia
Code, 3" the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Salmons.345
The Eastern District of Virginia also addressed the ACPA in
335. Id. at 863.
336. See id. at 861-62. Plaintiff used
tion:Technodome" in marketing, advertising,
vices. Id. at 861.
337. Id. at 863.
338. Id. at 861.
339. Id. at 863.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 863-64.
342. Id. at 864.
343. 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000).
text.
344. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(1)
for exercising personal jurisdiction).
345. Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 868.

the marks "Technodome" and "Destinaand distributing its various goods and ser-

See supra notes 313-30 and accompanying
(Cum. Supp. 2001) (outlining the provisions
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Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names,146 where the court
examined "whether [a] plaintiff must plead the element of bad
faith in an in rem proceeding brought under the ACPA."3 47 Harrods sought declaratory and injunctive relief pertaining to the
"'improper registration and use'" of sixty internet domain
names,
3
such as cyberharrods.com and harrodsamerica.com.

1

Harrods argued that "bad faith intent" cannot be an element of
the action because it is not mentioned in the subsection of the
ACPA creating the in rem action.349 Plaintiff also asserted that
requiring proof of bad faith undermines the purpose of providing
remedies for trademark owners who cannot find the person or entity responsible for registering the offending domain names.
The court chose to follow the only other federal court to address
the issue 351 by holding "that bad faith intent to profit
is a neces352
sary element of an in rem action under the ACPA."
In Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com, 3

3

the plaintiff,

having registered the trademarks "Inverlat" and "Inverweb,"354
brought an in rem action against the defendants, "alleging that
the defendants registered [inverlat.com and inverweb.com] with
the bad faith intent to profit from [the] plaintiffs... trademarks."35 5 Banco Inverlat sent defendant Mauricio De La Orta

copies of the complaint via overnight mail and e-mail, which resulted in actual notice to the defendants. 356 Banco Inverlat then
sought an order permitting
it to "dispense with an order of publi3 57
cation under the ACPA."

The court ruled that the ACPA grants the district courts the
discretion "to excuse the ACPA's requirement in in rem actions

346. 110 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Va. 2000).
347. Id. at 423.
348. Id. at 422.
349. Id. at 424. In rem actions under the ACPA are addressed in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(Supp. V 1999).
350. Harrods, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
351. See Broadbridge Media v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that bad faith must be proven for an in rem action under the ACPA).
352. Harrods,110 F. Supp. 2d at 425, 427.
353. 112 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va. 2000).
354. Id. at 521-22.
355. Id. at 522.
356. See id.
357. Id.
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for service by publication where service is accomplished by...
alternative means... of service via the [defendant's] postal and
e-mail addresses."35 8 The court noted that requiring a plaintiff to
give notice to a defendant by publication would be redundant in
cases where the defendant has already received a copy of the
relevant pleadings by regular mail and by e-mail. 9
At issue in Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com 360 was whether the ACPA allows a trademark owner to
maintain both an in personam claim against the registrant of an
infringing domain name and an in rem claim against the allegedly infringing domain name itself.361' After coining the term "Alitalia," plaintiff, Italy's national airline, registered the mark. 6 2
Meanwhile, defendant Technologia JPR ("JPR"), which runs an
online gambling company based in the Dominican Republic, registered casinoalitalia.com and used the term "Alitalia" on its Web
363
site.
After examining the two remedies for "cyberpiracy" provided in
the ACPA, 6 4 the court ruled that the statute's in rem and in personatn jurisdictional grants are mutually exclusive.16 ' Thus, a
plaintiff may not concurrently pursue ACPA claims against both
the alleged infringer and the allegedly infringing domain name.3 66
Unlike America Online and Heathmount, the court focused on
Virginia Code section 8.01-328.1(A)(4) of the Virginia long-arm
statute,6 7 concluding that it reached defendant's contacts with

358. Id. at 521.
359. Id. at 523-24.
360. 128 F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001).
36L Id. at 341.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 342.
364. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999) ("A person shall be liable in a
civil action by the owner of a mark."), with § 1125(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999) ('The owner of a
mark may file an in rem action against the domain name.").
365. Alitalia-Linee, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
366. Id.
367. Compare America Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000), and Heathmount,
106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000) (analyzing personal jurisdiction by focusing on VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-328(A)(1) (Cum.Supp. 2001), which provides for personal jurisdiction
over a person who [t]ransact[s] any business in [the] Commonwealth"), with AlitaliaLinee, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001) (focusing on VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(4)
(Cum. Supp. 2001), which provides for personal jurisdiction over a person who "[clausfes]
tortious injury in [the] Commonwealth by an act or omission outside [the] Commonwealth
if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of con-
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Virginia.3 6 JPR's trademark infringement met the statute's requirement of a tortious injury in Virginia, the court reasoned, because JPR's use of the domain name was "likely to cause confusion, mistake, and deception of Virginia consumers."3 69 Moreover,
JPR's maintenance of an interactive Web site accessible to Virginia consumers twenty-four hours a day constituted "persistent
course of conduct." 37" Therefore, "because JPR [was] subject to in
personam jurisdiction in Virginia, Alitalia, [could not] maintain
its ACPA in rem cause of action."3 7'
In Hartog & Co. v. SWX COM,3 2 an action brought under the
in rem provision of the ACPA,3 73 a Norwegian company sought
transfer of two Internet domain names from a Swiss registrant. 4
Hartog and Company ("Hartog"), whose products include ski
waxes and accessories bearing its "SWIX" mark, alleged that the
Swiss company's possession of swix.com and swix.net confused
and frustrated its customers. 5
The court ultimately found that although the domain names in
issue were sufficiently similar to the plaintiffs mark to fall within
the ACPA's proscription against bad faith registration, the facts
did not support a finding that the registrant of the domain names
had acted with bad faith intent.37 6 Instead, the court found that
the registrant was "not a 'cybersquatter' or 'cyberpirate' within
either the letter or the spirit of the ACPA... [but rather] a legitimate businessman."37 7 Therefore, the court held that the
ACPA did not apply because the registrant failed to act with bad
faith intent.378

duct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
[the] Commonwealth").
368. Alitalia-Linee, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 348.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 351.
372. 136 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2001).
373. The ACPA's primary purpose is to eliminate "cybersquatting" or "cyberpiracy" by
individuals reserving Internet domain names similar to trademarked names with no intention of using it in commerce. Id. at 536.
374. Id. at 533.
375. See id. at 534-35.
376. Id. at 537-38.
377. Id. at 542.
378. Id.
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V. FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS

A. FTC v. Pereira379
"In its 100th law enforcement action targeting deception on the
Internet,"8 ° the FTC charged the defendant, a foreign national,
with cloning existing Web sites and using these clone sites to direct unsuspecting Internet users to a pornographic Web site.381
The defendant's program then disabled the user's web browser
such that the user could not exit the pornographic site unless the
computer was shut down. 8 2 Presumably, the scheme was developed to generate high traffic on the defendant's Web site so that
he could charge higher prices for banner advertisements on his
site.3 ' The FTC filed the complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia." 4 As the court noted,
"this case illustrates both the ease with which scam artists
abroad can use the Internet to target consumers in the U.S. and
the importance of cooperation between consumer protection agencies in different countries."38 5
B. Applicationsfor Consent to the Transferof Control of Licenses
and Section 214 Authorizations
In determining that the public utility of the proposed
AOL/Time Warner merger outweighed the public harm, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") approved the merger
of the two corporations. 36 The FCC identified four major potential

379.

[1997-2001 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) %24,654 (E.D. Va. 1999).

380. Id.
381.

Id.

382. Id.
383.

Id.

384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to
AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee, 23 Communications Reg. (P & F) 157, at 250 (Jan. 11,
2001).
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problems with the merger and fashioned its order to deal with
these problems. 8 7
First, in response to fear that the newly formed company would
have the "ability and incentive to harm consumers in the residential high-speed Internet access services market by blocking unaffiliated ISPs' access to Time Warner cable facilities," the FCC
conditioned the approval on conditions relating to contracts and
negotiations with unaffiliated Internet service providers. 88 Second, the order forbade AOL Time Warner from "entering into contracts with AT&T that would give AOL exclusive carriage or preferential terms, conditions and prices."8 9 Third, the order
"impose[d] a condition requiring [the new company] ... to provide

interoperability between its NPD-based applications and those of
other providers, or to show by clear and convincing evidence that
circumstances have changed such that the public interest will no
longer be served by an interoperability condition." 9 ° Finally, in
response to fears that the new company would have "the ability
and the incentive to discriminate against interactive television
services," the order stated that the terms of the consent agreement should prevent such abuse.39 '
VI. NEW LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. InternetFreedom and BroadbandDeployment Act of2001392

This bill would amend the Communications Act of 1934'13 to
define "high speed data service" as a service capable of transmitting electronic information at a rate "generally not less than 384
kilobits per second in at least one direction."39 4 It would prohibit

387. Id. at 162.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 162-63.
391. Id. at 163.
392. H.R. 1542, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Representative Billy
Tauzin (R-LA) and introduced on April 24, 2001, before the United States House of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 147 CONG. REC. H1554 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2001). It was placed on the Union Calendar, No. 54, available at http'//thomas.loc.gov/.
393. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
394. See H.R. 1542 § 3(a)(3).
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the FCC and each state from regulating "the rates, charges,
terms, or conditions for... any high speed data service . . .or
Internet access service."395 The bill would also prohibit the FCC
from requiring an established local exchange carrier to: (1) provide unbundled access to any network elements used in the provision of any high speed data service; or (2) offer for resale at
wholesale rates any high speed data service.3 96
B. Broadband Competition and Incentives Act of 2001,"9'
American BroadbandCompetitionAct of 2001,398 and
BroadbandAntitrust Restorationand Reform Act of 2001399
These measures, a response to the Internet Freedom and
Broadband Deployment Act of 2001,400 are designed to ensure the
application of the antitrust laws to the telecommunications industry.4 ' The Broadband Competition and Incentives Act of 2001
would amend the Clayton Act °2 to restrict the provision of inregion broadband telecommunications services by Bell operating
companies ° and would eliminate discriminatory taxes on broadband service providers.4" 4 The American Broadband Competition
Act of 2001 also would amend the Clayton Act to make the antitrust laws applicable to certain violations in the telecommunica395. See id. § 4(a).
396. See id. § 4(b).
397. H.R. 1697, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Representative John
Conyers (D-MI) and introduced on May 3, 2001, before the United States House of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 147 CONG. REC. H1923 (daily ed. May 3,
2001). Hearing held by the House Committee on the Judiciary. Id. at D496 (daily ed. June
22, 2001).
398. H.R. 1698, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Representative Chris
Cannon (R-UT) and introduced on May 3, 2001, before the United States House of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Energy and Commerce. 147 CONG. REC. H1923 (daily ed. May 3, 2001).
Hearing held by House Committee on the Judiciary. Id. at D496 (daily ed. June 22, 2001).
399. H.R. 2120, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was also sponsored by Representative
Cannon and introduced on June 12, 2001, before the United States House of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Energy and Commerce. 147 CONG. REC. H3066 (daily ed. June 12, 2001). A
motion to report the measure failed. Id. at D574 (daily ed. June 13, 2001).
400. H.R. 1542.
40L See H.R. 1697; H.R. 1698.
402. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
403. H.R. 1697 § 101. A "Bell operating company" is defined under 47 U.S.C. §
153(4)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
404. Id. § 201.
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tions industry4°5 and would create an alternative process to resolve disputes arising under interconnection agreements.4 " The
final measure amending the Clayton Act, the Broadband Antitrust Restoration and Reform Act, would require Bell operating
companies to file an application with the United States Attorney
General before providing any in-region Internet services.407
40 8

C. Drug Competition Act of 2001

This bill would enhance the ability of the Department of Justice and the FTC to enforce federal antitrust laws against manufacturers of brand name and generic drugs.409 The proposal would
require brand name and generic drug makers to file a notice with
both agencies within ten days of entering into any agreements regarding the sale or manufacture of the generic drug equivalent to
that brand name drug, if the agreement could limit "the research,
development, manufacture,41 marketing, or selling of a generic
drug 41 0 by another maker.

1

D. Free Market Antitrust Immunity Reform (FAIR) Act of 2001412
This bill would "amend the Shipping Act of 1984' to restore
the application of the antitrust laws to certain agreements" 4 14 in-

405. H.R. 1698 § 2.
406. Id. § 3.
407. H.R. 2120 § 2.
408. H.R. 1063, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 754, 107th Cong. (2001). H.R. 1063 was introduced by Representative Robert Andrews (D-NJ) on March 15, 2001, before the United
States House of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on
the Judiciary and the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 147 CONG. REc. H953 (daily
ed. Mar. 15, 2001). The identical Senate component, S. 754, was introduced by Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) on April 6, 2001, before the United States Senate. 147 CONG. REC.
S3760 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2001). It was then referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Id. at S3706 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2001).
409. H.R. 1063 § 3; S. 754 § 3.
410. H.R. 1063 § 5(2); S. 754 § 5.
411. H.R. 1063 §§ 5-6; S. 754 §§ 5-6.
412. H.R. 1253, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Representative James
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and introduced on March 27, 2001, before the United States House
of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary
and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 147 CONG. REC. H1189 (daily
ed. Mar. 27, 2001).
413. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1719 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
414. H.R. 1253, pmbl.
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cluding certain assessment agreements and marine terminal operator agreements.4 1 5
E. Rail Competition Enforcement Act of 2001416 and Rail Merger
Reform and CustomerProtectionAct4 17
If enacted, the Rail Competition Enforcement Act would amend
Title 49 of the United States Code by eliminating the exemptions
of rail agreements and transactions that are subject to approval
by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) from antitrust laws.4"'
Meanwhile, legislation was proposed that would not only remove
rail carriers' antitrust exemption 1 9 but would also "strengthen
the standards by which the STB reviews railroad mergers."4 2 °
Under the provisions of the Rail Merger Reform and Customer
Protection Act,4 2 ' the STB would be authorized to withhold its approval of rail mergers unless it "finds that the transaction: (1) will
not reduce competitive rail routes available to current railroad
customers; (2) will provide additional rail to rail competition and
competitive options for railroad customers; (3) will improve service to2 2customers; and (4) is in conformity with the antitrust
4
laws."

F. Airline Merger MoratoriumAct423
Under the proposed measure introduced in the Senate, a two-

415. Id. § 2.
416. S. 526, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Senator Byron Dorgan (RNI) and introduced on March 13, 2001, before the United States Senate, at which time it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 147
CONG. REC. S2228 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2001).
417. H.R. 999, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Representative Earl
Pomeroy (D-ND) and introduced on March 13, 2001, before the United States House of
Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary
and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 147 CONG. REC. H876 (daily ed.
Mar. 13, 2001).
418. S.526, pmbl., § 2.
419. See H.R. 999.
420. Id. at pmbl.
421. Id.
422. Id. § 2.
423. S.578, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Senator Dorgan and introduced on March 20, 2001, before the United States Senate, at which time it was referred
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 147 CONG. REC. S2592
(daily ed. Mar. 20,2001).
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year moratorium would be placed on major airline mergers.4 24
During this period, the United States Department of Transportation would evaluate the impact that airline industry consolidations and mergers have had on consumers in the areas of pricing,
services, and flight availability.4 2 A similar proposal, calling for a
one-year moratorium on airline mergers, was introduced in the
United States House of Representatives. 6
G. High Density Airport CompetitionAct of 2001427
This bill, "in an effort to increase and maintain competition in
the domestic aviation industry,"4 2 8 would amend the Clayton Act
by imposing limits on the amount of takeoff and landing slots
large airlines can own at Washington Reagan National and New
York's LaGuardia Airports.42 9
H. Antitrust Technical CorrectionsAct of 2001430
This measure passed the House of Representatives on March

424. S.578 § 2.
425. Id. § 7.
426. H.R. 761, 107th Cong. (2001) (the Airline Merger Moratorium Act of 2001). This
bill was sponsored by Representative Louise Slaughter (D-NY) and introduced on February 27, 2001, before the United States House of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. 147 CONG. REc. H442 (daily ed. Feb. 27,
2001).
427.

S. 520, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Senator Mike DeWine (R-

OH) and introduced on March 13, 2001, before the United States Senate, at which time it
was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 147 CONG. REC. S2221-S2222
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 2001). The "Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition conducted hearings ...after receiving testimony from Hershel I. Kamen, Continental
Airlines, Inc., Washington, D.C.; Kevin P. Healy, AirTran Airways, Inc., Orlando, Florida;
and Kevin P. Mitchell, Business Travel Coalition, Lafayette Hill, Pennsylvania" 147
CONG. REC. D244 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2001).
428. 147 CONG. REC. S2221 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2001).
429. S.520 § 2.
430. H.R. 809, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill was sponsored by Representative Sensenbrenner and introduced on March 1, 2001, before the United States House of Representatives, at which time it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Armed Services. 147 CONG. REC. H621 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001). On March 8,
the House Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill to the House favorably. See H.R.
REP. No. 107-17, pt. 1, at 4 (2001). On March 14, the bill was passed by the House, and on
March 15, the bill was received by the United States Senate and referred to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary. 147 CONG. REC. H888-H889 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001); 147
CONG. REC. 52387 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001).
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14, 2001." If enacted, it would make six separate "technical corrections"43 2 to the Sherman Act,4"' Clayton Act,43 4 Federal Trade
Commission Act," and other laws.4 36 The bill would repeal the
Taking Depositions in Public Act 7 and a provision of the Panama Canal Act" 8 prohibiting antitrust violators from utilizing
the Panama Canal.4" 9 Other changes would include amending
section 3 of the Sherman Act to clarify that section 2 applies to
the District of Columbia and the Territories" ° and correcting an
error in the statutory codification of the Clayton Act."
I. "econsumer.gov"PilotProject-Memorandumof
Understanding"2
In an effort to thwart Internet fraud, the FTC, along with
twelve consumer protection agencies from countries such as Australia, Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, recently
signed a memorandum of understanding creating "econsumer.gov.""3 Dubbed "a joint effort to gather and share crossborder e-commerce complaints," econsumer.gov aims to enforce
consumer protection laws by forwarding complaints received via
an online complaint form to the appropriate consumer protection
The Web site will also contain conenforcement personnel."
sumer protection information for the participating countries." 5

431. 147 CONG. REC. H888 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001).
432. H.R. 809, pmbl.
433. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
434. Id. §§ 12-27a (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
435. Id. §§ 41-77 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
436. H.R. 809 § 2.
437. 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1994).

438. Id. § 31 (1994).
439.

Id.; H.R. 809 § 2.

440.

H.R. 809 § 2b.

441. Id. § 2(d)(2)(A).
442. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,178 (May 2, 2001).
443. Id.
444. Id. The information will be shared using the existing consumer Sentinel network,
"an automated database maintained by the [FTC] that stores consumer complaint data
and other investigatory information provided by consumers, participating law enforcement
agencies, and other contributors about consumer fraud and deception." Id.
445. Id. Countries participating in the memorandum of understanding in addition to
those named above are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, and
Sweden. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION

As was the case in recent years, antitrust and trade regulation
cases are reflecting the growth in the technology and service aspects of our economy, and disputes have increasingly appeared in
these areas. Antitrust cases will continue to be brought by groups
of competitors that seek to keep others from competing with an
enhanced service or price, as the courts continue to recognize
such claims this year.
Causation and injury issues continue to plague conspiracy
plaintiffs, whether under the Sherman Act or the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act. Litigation inevitably follows the termination
of a dealership or franchise regardless of whether the action is
brought under the Sherman Act or a Virginia regulatory statute,
and care must be taken to avoid unnecessary involvement in such
legal claims.
Further, while on the books, both the Virginia Uniform Trade
Secrets Act and the Virginia Consumer Protection Statutes are
being strictly scrutinized. With regards to the former, a recent
decision exposes Virginia businesses to clandestine industrial espionage; and, with regards to the latter, Virginia consumers are
left without a real remedy.
Finally, after several years of judicial expansion, it now appears that the courts may be taking a more critical look at Virginia's Business Conspiracy Act. In one recent case, the Supreme
Court rejected the jury's finding of conspiracy based on its own
review of the evidence.
This year the courts examined a wide variety of antitrust and
trade regulation theories. Only a few of these theories had a successful outcome. Whether the courts continue this trend remains
to be seen.

